Islamic State Flash Report - 10 February 2026
Islamic State (IS) affiliates demonstrated sustained operational capacity across multiple theaters, with notable activity in Iraq, West Africa, and online propaganda networks. In Iraq, IS remnants conducted suicide attacks and maintained active cells in western Anbar and Nineveh provinces, prompting large-scale security operations and heightened border reinforcements amid concerns over detainee escapes from Syrian facilities. [1] In West Africa, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) killed at least 20 civilians in eastern Congo, while the Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) executed a coordinated drone-and-ground assault on a Nigerian military base, killing nine soldiers. [3][7] Meanwhile, Dutch authorities arrested 15 individuals for spreading IS propaganda on TikTok, underscoring the group's persistent efforts to radicalize and recruit through social media platforms. [4]
Significant Incidents and Articles of Interest
ADF Mass Casualty Attack – Mambimbi-Isigo Village, Democratic Republic of Congo: The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), an IS-pledged affiliate, killed at least 20 civilians in a pre-dawn raid on Mambimbi-Isigo village in North Kivu province's Lubero territory on February 7, 2026. The attackers first raided farmers' fields before assaulting civilians with knives and firearms, with civil society leaders reporting many residents remain missing and the death toll likely to rise. The assault triggered mass displacement, exacerbating an already dire humanitarian crisis in the region [3]. This attack contributes to a pattern of ADF violence that has claimed 62 civilian lives in Beni and Lubero territories since January 2026. The group, which pledged allegiance to IS in 2019 and operates along the Uganda-DRC border, has been blamed for thousands of civilian deaths since relocating from Uganda following military strikes in 2002. The timing coincided with a UN peacekeeping chief visit to assess ADF-affected areas, highlighting the persistent security vacuum enabling extremist operations [3].
IS Detainee Transfer Crisis – Syria to Iraq: Iraq has received 2,250 IS-affiliated prisoners from Syrian detention facilities as of February 8, 2026, as part of a broader agreement to transfer up to 7,000 detainees amid security concerns following the January offensive by Syrian Arab Army forces against Kurdish-administered northeast Syria. Damascus-aligned factions seized control of key detention sites previously managed by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), including al-Shaddadi prison, al-Hol camp in Hasaka, and al-Aqtan prison in Raqqa—facilities housing tens of thousands of IS members and family members [2][5]. Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani characterized the transfer as an "Iraqi decision made to preserve national, regional, and international security," with transferred prisoners held in "fortified precautionary centers" under exclusive Iraqi judicial authority. The initiative, coordinated with Washington, addresses fears that IS remnants could exploit the security vacuum created by the January 30 ceasefire agreement between Damascus and the SDF. Iraqi officials confirmed some transferred detainees include individuals accused of crimes against Yazidis, adding complexity to prosecution efforts [2][5].
IS Propaganda Network Dismantled – Netherlands: Dutch authorities arrested 15 suspects aged 16 to 53 on February 10, 2026, for allegedly spreading IS propaganda via TikTok and inciting terrorist attacks, following an investigation launched in August 2025. The probe began after The Hague police identified a TikTok account sharing IS videos with Dutch subtitles promoting martyrdom and recruitment, with some posts receiving over 100,000 views. Law enforcement attributed the content to a coordinated network that amplified propaganda reach through interconnected accounts [4][9]. Thirteen suspects hold Syrian nationality, while four are Dutch citizens, suggesting dual national involvement. The arrests occurred across multiple Dutch regions, with authorities emphasizing that "glorifying and spreading propaganda seriously undermines public safety." This operation reflects growing concern about IS's continued exploitation of commercial social media platforms for radicalization, particularly targeting Dutch-speaking audiences through localized content that circumvents traditional counter-messaging efforts [4][9].
Bondi Beach Terror Attack Intelligence Failure – Australia: New information emerged regarding the December 2025 Bondi Beach terror attack in which Sajid Akram and his son Naveed killed 15 people in an IS-inspired assault during a Hanukkah celebration. A former ASIO undercover agent codenamed "Marcus" disclosed that he reported to Australian intelligence in 2019 that Sajid Akram voiced support for IS, praised jailed IS leader Isaac El Matari's planned Sydney attacks, and expressed admiration for Al Qaeda propagandist Anwar al-Awlaki [6]. Marcus claimed he infiltrated a Sydney IS cell and observed both Akrams attending a May 2019 religious retreat at which extremists attempted to radicalize Naveed with propaganda videos and discussed attack plans. ASIO investigated the claims but determined them "unsubstantiated," assessing in 2020 that Naveed "did not adhere to or intend to engage in violent extremism." Investigators now believe Sajid may have already been radicalized during his 2019 ASIO interview, raising questions about intelligence assessment failures that allowed him to legally acquire firearms and travel to the Philippines, a former IS hotspot, without triggering alerts. A royal commission is examining the case [6].
Coalition Anti-IS Strategy Shift – Saudi Arabia Meeting: The Global Coalition to Defeat IS convened in Riyadh on February 9, 2026, for its first meeting since the January 30 Damascus-SDF ceasefire agreement, with Syria formally joining as the coalition's 90th member and assuming "national leadership of counter-IS efforts" in Syria [5]. US Syria Envoy Tom Barrack and Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani co-chaired the session alongside Saudi officials, marking a significant diplomatic realignment as Damascus takes over primary counter-IS responsibilities from the SDF, which lost approximately 12,000 fighters—including 5,000 Arabs and 7,000 Kurds—during the anti-IS campaign. Coalition priorities now include "swift transfer and safeguarding of IS detainees, third-country repatriation, dignified reintegration of families from al-Hol and Roj camps," and coordination between Damascus and Baghdad on future operations. Syrian leaders "expressed appreciation for the sacrifices made by the SDF" while coalition members pledged direct support to Syrian and Iraqi counter-IS efforts, signaling a strategic transition from Kurdish-led to state-led operations amid ongoing concerns about IS resurgence [5].
IS Activity and Tactics
ISWAP and IS-Sahel Province (ISSP) – Drone Warfare Proliferation: IS West Africa Province has emerged as the most prolific IS African affiliate in drone operations, conducting at least 10 strikes since 2024 across Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad using commercially available quadcopter drones rigged with explosives [7]. Security analysts report these drones cost relatively little, have lower operational risks to fighters, and enable precision strikes on previously difficult military targets. ISWAP also employs drones for reconnaissance and surveillance missions before ground assaults, as demonstrated in the January 29 Borno attack combining aerial and infantry elements. Similarly, IS-Sahel Province executed approximately 20 drone strikes, including a potential February 29 assault on Niamey's international airport and nearby military bases that injured four personnel. The tactical evolution mirrors broader regional trends, with Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate, conducting 69 drone strikes in Mali and Burkina Faso using first-person view (FPV) drones to drop improvised explosives, suggesting knowledge transfer between extremist networks [7].
Iraq-Based IS Cells – Weapons Stockpiling and Suicide Operations: IS remnants in Iraq demonstrate sustained logistical capabilities through extensive weapons caches hidden in remote Anbar desert areas, including military-grade anti-aircraft guns, mortars, and explosive devices discovered in early February [1]. The group continues employing suicide bombers as tactical assets during security confrontations, with two militants detonating themselves during a February 7 operation in western Anbar. Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces' "Fourth Deterrence" operation targeted IS sanctuaries in Saladin and Diyala provinces, focusing on Mutaybija, Hawi al-Azim, and Jazirat al-Aith—areas the PMF identified as hosting IS administrative, security, and military leadership as well as operational planning centers [8]. The raid on Aisha Camp south of Lake Hamrin revealed IS's exploitation of rugged terrain for inter-cell movement, while seized materiel included weapons, ammunition, explosives, and logistical equipment supporting operations across Saladin, Diyala, and Kirkuk governorates [1][8].
ADF (IS-Central Africa) – Civilian-Focused Violence: The ADF maintains a targeting pattern emphasizing soft civilian targets in eastern DRC's North Kivu province, employing combined knife and firearm attacks against farming communities [3]. The February 7 Mambimbi-Isigo assault followed the group's established modus operandi of pre-dawn raids beginning with agricultural area incursions before transitioning to population center attacks designed to maximize casualties and displacement. With 62 civilians killed in Beni and Lubero territories since January 2026, the ADF demonstrates persistent operational tempo despite regional counterterrorism efforts. The group's border-straddling operations between DRC and Uganda enable sanctuary exploitation and complicate bilateral security coordination [3].
IS Propaganda Networks – Social Media Platform Exploitation: IS-affiliated networks increasingly leverage mainstream commercial platforms for localized propaganda dissemination, as evidenced by the Netherlands-based TikTok operation that achieved over 100,000 views per post through Dutch-subtitled content promoting martyrdom and recruitment [4][9]. The network employed interconnected accounts to amplify reach, demonstrating coordinated inauthentic behavior techniques typically associated with state-sponsored influence operations. The substantial Syrian national involvement (13 of 15 suspects) suggests diaspora community exploitation for recruitment and radicalization targeting European audiences. This tactic represents an evolution from encrypted messaging platforms to algorithmically-driven commercial social media, enabling broader audience reach while complicating platform moderation and law enforcement interdiction [4][9].
Geographic Trends – Syria-Iraq Border Exploitation: IS elements demonstrate sustained ability to exploit the 600-kilometer Syria-Iraq frontier for cross-border movement, logistics, and sanctuary, with Iraqi officials directly attributing increased Anbar and Nineveh province activity to Syrian prison breaks and security gaps [1]. The open desert terrain between provinces enables IS remnant mobility, prompting Iraq to deploy 13 brigade-equivalents (six PMF, three border guard, four army) along the border. The January violence in northeast Syria that enabled detainee escapes from SDF-controlled facilities created additional cross-border pressure, a challenge prompting the Iraq-US transfer agreement [2]. This dynamic underscores IS's persistent strategy of exploiting ungoverned spaces and inter-state seams for operational resilience [1].
Indicators to Watch
Persistence of Geographic Insurgent Sanctuaries: Monitor for continued IS activity in established safe havens, including the desert corridor between Anbar and Nineveh, the Hamrin Mountains, and the Mutaybija region in Iraq. An increase in attacks or security operations in these areas indicates their ongoing strategic importance to IS.
Syrian Transition and Detainee Security: Monitor the stability of the civil and military integration of northeast Syria following the January 30 Damascus-SDF agreement. Watch for security gaps or renewed IS activity as the Syrian government assumes control of detention facilities like al-Hol and al-Shaddadi, and track the security of the ongoing transfer of up to 7,000 IS detainees to Iraq.
Evolution of Online Radicalization: Observe the use of new social media platforms for IS propaganda beyond TikTok. Monitor for demographic shifts in recruitment, such as the targeting of minors, and track the online and physical activity of known radicalizing figures and hubs.
Evolution of Drone Use in Africa: Track the proliferation and sophistication of drone technology among IS affiliates in West and Central Africa. Monitor for the use of more advanced models, such as FPV drones, and their expansion to other affiliates.
